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Long-term Stability through Reforms  
The Power of Localism in the Northern Caucasus 
Abstract 
The paper is devoted to an analysis of governance strategies in conditions for the 
reform of local governance and land usage. Two central Caucasian regions - 
Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachay-Cherkessia were selected for a paired comparison, 
for they have similar institutional, geographic and ethnic features though different 
means of handling conflict: i.e. when there was relatively successful lowering of 
tensions arising in the early 1990s in Kabardino-Balkaria, and a dangerous escalation 
of conflict in Karachay-Cherkessia. 
In the context of reform, the strategy in Kabardino-Balkaria has been based on a 
freezing of democratic processes, like decentralization and pluralism, as well as a 
presidential veto on land privatization; whilst in Karachay-Cherkessia the privatization of 
agricultural land is going ahead at full speed, pluralism in the media is bringing activity 
to the political life of the republic, etc. 
Thus, stability in Kabardino-Balkaria, based as it is on conservative and often non-
democratic methods of governance, has led to social and economic stagnation - while 
tensions in Karachay-Cherkessia are going hand in hand with the growth of social 
development and economic activity. 
Particular emphasis can be placed on tensions arising during land privatization and the 
reform of local governance. At the local level of governance, a “change of hats” has 
taken place, while most other features from the Soviet period remain. The state has 
announced that there should be a maintaining of self-management at a local level, 
while in reality a redistribution of resources and power has occurred. During the 
privatization of land, no conflicts between ethnic groups were revealed, though there 
were between the state and locals (peasants, villages, etc.). The most effective strategy 
via which to maintain a balance between reforms and stability is, it would seem, based 
on the development of institutional diversity and the involvement of local actors (a 
strategy of “localism”).  
 This policy paper was produced under the 2006-07 International Policy Fellowship 
program. Alexsey Gunya was a member of the ‘Combating Open Society Threats’ 
working group, which was directed by Stephen Kotkin and Vadim Volkov. More details 
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Introduction 
Although the trials and tribulations in the North Caucasus have endured, 
local conflicts have not become sub-regional and/or deep-seated, and the 
basis of operations of daily life was and is being preserved. The anarchy so 
often predicted for the North Caucasus has not occurred. In every region 
there is a tense internal conflict over resources, posts, spheres of influence 
etc. A painful adaptation to the new conditions is taking place, to a large 
extent as a result of such competition. The inevitable tension in relations 
between different social layers and groups may even have played a positive 
role, especially in multi-ethnic regions, where large-scale conflicts and 
violence were to be most expected (Dagestan and Karachay-Cherkessia 
being prime examples). Here, conflict has not shifted from the occasional and 
local to being large-scale. In Dagestan, for example, the negotiations that 
came in the aftermath of sporadic clashes have managed to establish a 
balance under new conditions and have “played a stabilizing role in the 
political system as a whole”.1  
Despite the tensions, there are great motivations as regards development. 
Economic activities penetrate social life; and economic goals often link up with 
social problems, like unemployment, etc. What is better: undertaking reforms 
(with some risk of raising social tensions) or maintaining stability (albeit 
without reform)? All seven national North Caucasian republics are faced with 
this dilemma – and each republic has its own chosen route. 
A good example is a comparison of Kabardino-Balkaria with Karachay-
Cherkessia. These two neighboring regions have been selected so as to 
make a valid comparison of similar socio-economic, geographic and ethnic 
features going hand in hand with different governance strategies. In 
Kabardino-Balkaria, social life is strongly regulated by the state. There is 
censorship of the media, weak democratic institutions and there has been no 
land privatization. Weak democracy and media censorship in Kabardino-
                                            
1 Kisriev E. Formirovanie demokraticheskoi sistemy upravlenia v postkommunisticheskom 
Dagestane. Mestnoe samoupravlenie mnogoetnicheskimi soobshchestvami v stranah SNG. 
Ed. Tishkov V. and Кисриев Е. and Filippova E.. Moscow, 2001. Pp. 71-90. 
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Balkaria has contributed to a connecting of formal and shadow forces with a 
monopoly on violence. The unexpected events of 13 October, 2005 in Nalchik 
(the capital of Kabardino-Balkaria) might be seen as a result of defects in 
governing strategy accompanied by social and economic problems2.  
In Karachay-Cherkessia, in contrast, there is a permanent and relatively 
high level of tension, conflicts between different parties and strategic groups, 
there has been land privatization, and open criticism of regional authorities. 
The presidential elections in 1999 and 2003 brought about a great 
heightening of tension, which split society between different strategic 
groupings. A number of these strategic groups are based on clan associations 
with access to business resources. Precisely for this reason, inhabitants of the 
republic often describe the region as an “ungovernable democracy”. 
 
This research addresses the following questions: what benefits have 
liberal modes of governance brought Karachay-Cherkessia? Will a 
centralization of power as a mode of governance in Kabardino-Balkaria be 
stable in the long-term? What is important for long-term stability - land 
privatization (Karachay-Cherkessia) or the keeping of land by the state 
(Kabardino-Balkaria)? 
The main working hypothesis is that the short-term stability in 
Kabardino-Balkaria, which is based on formal institutions and centralized 
forms of governance, can only lead to economic and social stagnation and, in 
consequence, to a polarization of different strategic groupings and to a growth 
of tension; while, in contrast, the pluralistic and the more democratic 
environment of Karachay-Cherkessia, with a major role being played by 
hybrid institutions (state-traditional, formal-informal) is risky, though it might be 
seen as more adequate to a multi-ethnic region seeking long-term stability. 
 
Fieldwork research. To answer questions based on the hypothesis, a 
traditional analysis of facts and figures from statistics and newspapers is 
insufficient. What is required is an in-depth study of the functional and social 
                                            
2
 200 militants attacked the regional offices of Interior Ministry, a local prison, the regional 
border guard offices as well as the headquarters of the republican branch of the Federal 
Security Service. During 13-14 October more than 100 people were left for dead. 
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bonds regulating conflicts, which can highlight enduring mechanisms that 
serve to reproduce such bonds. This is why - in addition to research gathering 
statistics, making a geographical and sociological mapping, analysing 
information gained from the media etc. - intense research, including interviews 
with different actors (administrators, formal and informal leaders, local people, 
politicians, etc.), direct observations of society (perhaps acting together with 
society) etc., was conducted. Along with primary data collection, there has 
been an analysis of local governance (using official data); and we have looked 
at examples of the workings of several villages in both regions. Especially 
important was the study of land privatization in Karachay-Cherkessia, the 
patrimonial and economic relations of different ethnic groupings, and the role 
played by state and traditional institutions during land privatization. 
 
There are two types of data collection and scales of analyses, depending 
on regional and local levels (Table 1): 
Table 1. Distribution of methods and key institutions studied at regional 
and local levels 
Stage Territory Main objectives Approaches 
and methods 
Regional Kabardino-Balkaria 
and Karachai-Cherkessia 
A comparison of regional  
analogues of land use and of 
local government institutions 
Comparative, 
interdisciplinary, 
social, 
ethnographical 
 
Local Mountain (Balkarian 
and Karachai people) and 
plain (Kabardian and 
Chircassian people) areas 
of Kabardino-Balkaria and 
Karachai-Cherkessia 
Primary identification of 
land usage and local 
government institutions, and 
a description of their 
features and functions 
Social 
(interviews), 
social-
geographical 
(statistical, 
interviews, 
mapping) 
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1 Reform at a Local Level: Structural and 
Institutional Conditions 
 
Outlining the problem. Self-governance reform and land privatization are 
two objectives that are closely connected to each other because they both 
aim at a decentralization of power, a change of administration mechanisms 
existing from Soviet times, and take on board elite formation, resource 
distribution, etc. The realisation of these objectives has been hindered by 
social tensions that emerged among the population as a result of mistrust in 
the state and the conducted reforms. To what extent are institutional pluralism 
and land privatization in Karachay-Cherkessia beneficial if they maintain a 
high level of tension? Will it be stable in the future? And how effective has the 
centralization of power been in keeping conflicts down in Kabardino-Balkaria, 
or the marginalization of democratic procedures and the veto on land 
privatization? For how long can the situation last? How endurable is it? Is 
economic stagnation not too great a price to pay for a centralization of power? 
Traditional explanations referring to differences in history and culture between 
the two republics, comparisons between the mentalities/constructed 
characteristics of ethnic groups, and the personalities of leaders are 
insufficient – for we need to analyse the institutional framework of interaction 
between the different actors by accepting certain structural conditions (a multi-
ethnic structure, a difference between mountains with weak economic 
conditions and the “rich” plains, etc). 
 
1.1 Structural conditions: limiting factor of reforms?  
The most important factors to look at when carrying out local reforms are 
natural distinctions inside regions and the ethnic differences.  
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Share of the ethnic 
group in the republic’s 
population (%) 
Name of ethnic 
grouping 
Language 
1989 2002 
Basic form of 
traditional 
agriculture 
Kabardinians 49 55 
Cherkessians 
Adygian group 
(Caucasian 
family) 
9,7 11,3 
Arable farming 
(foothills/plains) 
Balkarians 9,6 11 
Karatchaevians 
Tyurskaya 
group (Altai 
family) 
31 38,5 
Mountain 
stockbreeding 
 
Especially in the North Caucasus, land plays many roles in the daily life of 
ethnic groups, namely as a place of residence and as a resource. Primarily, 
land is a territory of we-groups (persons with ethnic or regional identities), a 
location of cultural monuments, and graveyards - the place where the 
forefathers of kinship groups are buried etc. Land enables the reproduction of 
identity - and we-group identity needs territories and borders distinguishing it 
from “others”. 
 
Fig.1. Settlement in Kabardino-Balkaria (made by the author during the 
fieldwork) 
 
CENTER FOR POLICY STUDIES/INTERNATIONAL POLICY FELLOWSHIPS 2006/07 
 9 
In general, there are three settlement zones in Kabardino-Balkaria: plain 
Russian (lower than 300m above sea level), foothill and plain Kabardian (300 
to 700m) and mountain Balkar (above 700m) (fig. 1). For a long time, the main 
mechanism via which to regulate for the lack of lands was the long-term 
tradition of leasing arable and grazing lands. Kabardians were often privileged 
since they possessed both good arable lands and grazing lands in the middle 
mountains; Balkars had to exchange stock-raising products for Kabardian 
grain and use winter grazing lands on the plain. Cattle migration ceased when 
reforms began. Now, migration is non-significant in many valleys. Since the 
number of cattle has been reduced, extensive migration is no longer required. 
 
Fig. 2. Settlement in Karachay-Cherkessia (made by the author during the 
fieldwork). 
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In Karachay-Cherkessia the main ethnic groups have separate living areas 
in the Republic’s territory. Karachays are in the mountains and in the 
Republic’s Eastern side. Russians (Cossacks) and Cherkess occupy the plain 
in the West of the Republic. As a rule, an administrative division in rayons 
adheres to the ethnic structure (e.g. Cherkess people live in the Habesski 
rayon). The Karachay people actively migrate from the mountains to the 
plains, putting pressure on the Russians, the main motive here being a lack of 
land in the mountains - not the “natural aggression of Karachays”. 
Both Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachay-Cherkessia have major internal 
distinctions, which cannot be eliminated even via a strongly centralized model 
of governance. The structural conditions of mountain regions show the 
greatest inequalities, which require external regulation; and these attract the 
attention of the state. Objective inequalities additionally exist between 
different groups, caused by historical or natural factors. The rich plains and 
poor mountains, and also easily or poorly accessible regions, contrast with 
each other. Such differences are exacerbated by the fact that ethnic groups 
are not equally represented in the highlands and lowlands. For instance, the 
Balkarians were always in an unfavourable position, inhabiting not easily 
accessible and infertile mountain districts - while the Kabardinians have 
access to fertile land in the foothills and on the plains. These differences were 
partially compensated for by the state’s policy of subsidising the mountain 
regions and offering more favourable conditions to ethnic minorities etc. After 
the collapse of the USSR, the danger emerged that the balance that had been 
supported by the state between the mountain and the plain populations would 
collapse – and that one ethnic group would be left to depend on the other. 
 
1.2 Institutional framework and reform at the local level: the 
implementation of constitutional rules or one more redistribution of 
power and influence? 
 
The law of 1991 “On local self-government in the RSFSR” established the 
principle of local self-government’s independence, laid down the basic 
legislative provisions that were needed, established elective bodies and 
CENTER FOR POLICY STUDIES/INTERNATIONAL POLICY FELLOWSHIPS 2006/07 
 11 
determined the resources that these bodies controlled. Thus, almost 
everything was provided for, but the local authorities nevertheless were made 
responsible not to their electorate but to superior authorities. 
Since the mid-1990s, there have been three types of institution in North 
Caucasus villages: 
1. Administration – formally belonging to the official and local self-
government, though it is overseen/controlled by the state.  
2. Collective farms, changing their names in this period from kolkhozes 
and sovkhozes, with a variety of forms of joint stock company (KSKhP, АО, 
ООО, ТОО etc.) 
3. Traditional institutions, falling into two groups: those formalized by the 
state (e.g. a Council of Elders) and those remaining non-formalized (e.g. 
patrimonial networks). 
Transitions between these types of institutions have been blurred. The 
contemporary local level comprises a cocktail of state, traditional and hybrid 
institutions. The state’s exit from the local level and the replacement of state 
institutions by institutions of local self-management is taking place slowly. 
Local self-management (village administrations) does not yet possess the 
necessary powers.  Formally, local self-management had great powers but, in 
practice, local authorities are greatly dependent on state bodies. 
 
Attempts to transform the institutional structure 
 In June 2006, a council of municipal formations of the Kabardino-Balkaria 
Republic was created. Its declared goal was “to secure the rights of municipal 
formations as well as cooperate in dealing with social, economic and other 
problems“. In practice, this institution has a formal character and only imitates 
an activity in postulated direction. In consequence, local organs of power 
remain under the tutelage and control of higher institutions at both a regional 
and republic level. 
In recent years, "as an experiment", "taking on board special geopolitical 
conditions" and with various other pretexts, a number of laws have been 
adopted in the republic that aim to influence how local authorities are made 
up. Due to these measures, local authorities are being completely controlled 
and regulated. They might thus be seen as fully independent organisms (and 
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self-reproducing, by the same principles) that operate independently of the 
population; while their assessments of the needs of the population are poor. 
Members of this body undertake to hold onto their position by all available 
means because of the prestige and non-modest material resources these 
positions provide. 
What are the mechanisms via which such local authorities exist? On one 
hand, they are a tool of a powerful administration during elections; on the 
other, they presume the total or nearly total passivity of population. The 
reason for the latter is people’s lack of belief in the "noble" intentions of the 
state, disappointment when there is no opportunity to influence election 
results, an absence of any positive expectations irrespective of the outcome 
of elections («they are all the same»), and a dissociation of people who are 
engaged with their own troubles and do not feel as if they have any real power 
able to change their own lives. 
 
Institutional transformation in the agrarian sector 
According to the law of the Kabardino-Balkaria Republic (KBR) “About the 
use of agricultural land in KBR” from 2004 (30/07/2004 Nr.23-РЗ), there is a 
moratorium for 49 years in Kabardino-Balkaria prohibiting the privatization of 
agricultural lands. The passed moratorium can be conceived as an act of 
political will of the former President of KBR, Valerij Kokov; for he made public 
declarations that he would not make agriculturally important land private 
property. Two arguments were made use of: the first took into consideration 
the lack of land in the republic, and the second underlined the fact that a 
division of land would lead to social and ethnic explosions; as in the plain 
region (traditionally inhabited by Kabardians) there is more land and it is of 
better quality - while in the mountainous regions (which are predominantly 
populated by Balkarians) there is almost no plough-land. 
The problem of how to divide up the land has been a subject for numerous 
debates by politicians, statesmen and scientists. The idea that such a 
question is subject to the decisions of those who do and work on this land is 
alien to everybody within the strongly centralized system of the republic. The 
central authority of the republic will keep full control as long as districts need 
to depend on resource allocations, as long as they are not able to form their 
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budgets independently and as long as decisions on economic issues depend 
on the ability to "to fight for” or "to obtain" resources from a higher level. Any 
positive examples coming from the neighbouring region of Karachay-
Cherkessia were derided when the powers-that-be referred to the uniqueness 
of Kabardino-Balkaria.   
In contrast with Kabardino-Balkaria, a large part of the agricultural land in 
Karachay-Cherkessia is shared property. The norm of a land share makes 2 
to 6 hectares, depending on the district. Apart from state authorities, other 
actors are involved in privatisation concerns too: local structures of self-
governance and representatives of basic ethnic groups. The obliteration of 
this example demonstrates a reluctance to carry out reforms and reveals a 
fear on the part of the authorities of losing influence over the "bases". This 
leads to a situation where constitutional rights are not respected or where 
their performance is postponed on no uncertain terms. 
 
What is not visible? Besides the obvious and/or implicit obstacles 
created by officials, an informal circle of land managers of has been 
established, whose income sources originate not only from leases but also 
from production (e.g. alcohol produced from wheat, and never registered). It is 
not easy to collect data concerning cultivated lands. Shadow land tenants are 
sometimes quite successful businesspersons. To a certain degree, plough-
lands remain a combination of leased and private property, and are subject to 
uncontrolled usage; this phenomenon is known as a “shadow lease”. Such a 
land lease remains unregistered and, according the documents, these lands 
are seen as being ‘waste’. A complete inventory of lands (which should by 
definition precede privatization) as well as a registration of partial owners 
cannot suit those who currently benefit from the system.  
Because of the specifics of the institutional framework and owing to natural 
conditions, state reforms from “above” are ineffective in the mountain regions. 
State intrusion into this sphere occurred in the past, of course, in the form of 
forced collectivisation, relocations, the merging of villages etc. - yet these 
moves were unsuccessful, for the local level constantly ‘slipped beyond’ the 
state’s grasp. 
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2 Reforms and Stability: Strategies at a 
Deadlock? 
 
Local reforms are tightly connected with preserving stability. This causal 
relationship - reforms (or lack of reforms) and conflict - is able to help us 
evaluate development strategies in the case of these regions. We need to 
understand conflicts as dynamic social processes. Conflict require people 
making choices - and conflict requires interpersonal action/activity. In such 
mountainous regions as the North Caucasus conflict exists as a “normal” and 
dynamic social process (with structural conditions always reproducing 
inequality). If we take conflict as a dynamic social process, the question is not 
why conflict exists but, rather, whether it is dealt with in a violent way and 
whether it is conducive to or disruptive of social cohesion and institutional 
adaptation. The focus of conflict analysis must therefore be to assess what it 
is concerned with, who is involved, how it is carried out and, finally, how it 
changes its own environment, i.e. changes the constellation of involved 
actors, the bearing of affected institutions and the distribution of required 
resources. 
The complex settlement and land use structures in Kabardino-Balkaria and 
Karachay-Cherkessia have complicated the institutionaling of conflict 
procedures occurring during times of reform. Conflicts in these regions have 
been characterized by local and short-lived outbreaks of violence: 
Inter-ethnic face-offs, with violence (seldom, and only in 1991-1993); 
Inter-ethnic tensions with a latent processes of migration, discrimination, 
etc.; 
Conflicts over rules about distributions and the use of strategic resources, 
like land. 
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Some examples are given below:  
Inter-ethnic / territorial conflict 
 
Despite the generally peaceful co-existence that had prevailed hitherto, at the 
start of the 1990s conflicts escalated and involved not just individuals, but 
groups, based on ethnicity. Kabardino-Balkaria, the area where Balkar 
settlements are juxtaposed with Kabardinian proved to be most pregnant with 
conflict. It was here that the most acute cases of conflicts spilling over into 
violence occurred. They all originated in social disputes, but then grew into 
ethnic confrontations. For example, the trigger for the conflict between the 
Kabardinian village of Khamidie and the Balkarian village of Novaya Balkaria 
was the murder of a Kabardinian by a Balkarian in the town of Nalchik. Two 
days later, a group of 60 Kabardinians carried out a pogrom on Balkarian 
farms. The group comprised relatives of the slain man and villagers from 
Khamidie. Soon afterwards, a group of Kabardinians carried out an attack on 
the village of Novaya Balkaria. The conflict threatened to escalate into mutual 
violence. The Balkarians felt insecure, since they were the only Balkarian 
village in a Kabardinian area. The village had been founded at the end of the 
1950s for Balkarians returning from deportation to Central Asia, persons 
wanting to settle not in their home territory in the mountains but in the foothills 
where there was more land. 
Tensions between Balkarians and Kabardinians were exacerbated by the 
circulation of myths referring to “our” land and of the allegedly aggressive 
behavior of one ethnic group or the other. At Kabardinian gatherings, villagers 
asked the local authorities to liquidate Balkarian farms in their district. This 
was the background against which the conflict might have got out of control 
and turned into violence. 
Means of conflict regulation: efforts at mediation both by state structures 
and officials (including the president) as well as by social-political 
organizations and individual leaders. 
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Politics and conflict at the local level 
 
 Regulation of local conflicts differs widely from village to village. In the 
village of Kaidan in Karachay-Cherkessia, a number of ethnic groups border 
onto each other. The village is inhabited by 60% Karachays and 40% Abasins 
(related to the Tcherkessians). The presidential elections in 1999 split the 
village. The Abasins voted for Derev, and the Karachays for Semenov. In 
2003, the situation repeated itself, though the tension did not spill over into 
violence. Also, taking into account the sad experience of the presidential 
elections, in the elections for the head of the village administration it was 
decided to allow two candidates from one ethnic group to stand (non-
competitive elections are illegal). As was the case with the presidential 
elections in 2003, the price of recruiting for one or the other camps increased, 
which reduced the motivation of ethnic ‘entrepreneurs’. The council of Elders, 
comprising both Abasins and Karachays, plays an important role in such 
mediation. 
The village of Khetagurov, an Ossetian enclave in a Karachay area, 
constitutes another example. In the presidential elections of 2003, the 
Ossetians voted in a majority for Batdyev. Between the first and second 
rounds of voting, a bomb was thrown in the yard of one of the Ossetian 
activists. That was decisive in causing a majority of Ossetians to vote for 
Semenov in the second round. In contrast to Kaidan, in Khetagurov traditional 
institutions of self-government are weak. The majority of Ossetians wish, in 
the future, to relocate to other regions, where they can enjoy more rights 
when, for example, seeking work. 
 
Conflict over pasturage 
 
 At the start of the 1990s, and in consequence of the state’s collapse, 
transhumance practically ceased. Small-scale clashes between livestock 
herders and locals were ubiquitous. Thus, at the start of 1992, the inhabitants 
of the mountain hamlet of Verkhnii Baksan (El’brus district in Kabardino-
Balkaria) blocked the road along which sheep were being driven from the 
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village of Bylym to mountain pastures (i.e. the inhabitants of both Verkhnii 
Baksan and Bylym were Balkarians). Their justification was that, in conditions 
of economic crisis, there would soon be insufficient pasture. It took two years 
for the conflict to be fully resolved.1 A not insignificant role was played here by 
official and unofficial talks and improvements in the economic situation of the 
republic. 
 
 
 
We need to additionally analyse the third type of conflict with low level of 
latent violence, which might be characterized as a socially embedded 
conflict3. During land privatization in Karachay-Cherkessia, this type of conflict 
occurred in two forms: a) within the village community, between the 
inhabitants themselves and b) between inhabitants and the authorities. 
 
2.1 Conflicts over land between we-groups 
 
Conflicts over land display two features: a) competition for a limited 
amount of land (either due to natural conditions or due to population growth); 
b) a struggle for surplus production, which can then be sold (for instance, a 
disputed pasture can give additional production for market). In the first case, 
the conflict takes place between individuals and local authorities, for they 
share one resource that is limited and difficult to divide. In the second case, 
conflict might arise between entrepreneurs, persons who are not necessarily 
resident in the region but who profit from the sale of the surplus product – and 
who are prepared to use all means possible to get what they want.  
                                            
3 Zürcher, C. (2002). Institutionen und organisierte Gewalt. Konflikt- und Stabilitätsdynamiken 
im (post-) sowjetischen Raum. Berlin: Habilitationsschrift, Fachbereich Politik- und 
Sozialwissenschaft der Freien Universität Berlin. Koehler Jan and Zürcher Christoph (2004). 
Conflict and the State of the State in the Caucasus and Central Asia: an Empirical Research 
Challenge. Berliner Osteuropa Info. № 21. S. 57-67. 
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An analysis of figures (mostly coming via notices in papers) shows that the 
most controversial issue during land privatisation in Karachay-Cherkessia was 
the location of plots of land. The quantity of land did not cause any conflict, as 
this had already been fixed in 1992, when the land was divided equally 
between the members of collective farms and they were given the relevant 
certification. The fieldwork data indicates that, in connection with an unequal 
distribution and a deficit of resources, we-groups are forced to enter into 
cooperative relationships, which have rules pertaining to the joint usage of 
land and space. This is especially characteristic of mountain areas, where 
several “clusters” of such institutions and forms of cooperative relation can be 
seen: 
 
1) Exchange, based on specialization and the division of labour. 
Historically, mountain dwellers (Balkars and Karachays) occupied the lands of 
the high and middle mountains, which were not suitable for dividing into plots 
but only for animal grazing. As a result, the mountain dwellers were forced to 
exchange animal products for arable products produced by the population of 
the foothills and plains (Kabardians and Cherkess). This mutually beneficial 
form of interrelation between we-groups (created according to the territory of 
residence) has a complicated history. Even in the Soviet period, when 
resources were redistributed from top to bottom, this way of operating 
continued to exist, for instance in the form of traditional bazaars where 
exchanges in kind took place. In the 1990s, the role of bazaars increased 
dramatically. Organized, special markets underlined the regional specifics of 
products up for sale: cabbage coming from upper Balkaria, wool products 
from Chegem, honey from the Cossack farms of the foothills etc. Ethnicity 
was a secondary issue. 
2) The leasing of land. Two types of land lease are most common: a) 
leasing for the long-term use of pasture or plough land, and b) a seasonal 
leasing of pasture-land. Long-term leasing of pasture and plough land was 
practiced before the revolution. In Soviet times, lands that had been leased 
were secured by the kolkhozes and sovkhozes for long-term usage.4 
                                            
4
 Ghirugov R.T. Semelnaya arenda: realnost perspektiv. Nalchik, El-Fa. 1999. 
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Previously, the leasing of land had often caused disputes over the ownership 
of such land. These disputes died down in Soviet times, though, i.e. when the 
state became the monopoly landowner. Yet questions related to the price of 
land emerged once again in the 1990s – and national-political activity played 
a significant role here. At its peak (in the first half of the 1990s), land became 
an object to be divided up between self-declared “republics”. 
Only subsequently did land acquire a price set by the market, becoming an 
object of privatization in cities and semi-urban areas. In Kabardino-Balkaria, 
the president vetoed the privatization of agricultural land, the main type of 
land for appropriation, which meant that land remained outside the market 
process. In Karachay-Cherkessia, the privatization of agricultural land goes 
ahead at full speed. By July 2006, the majority of collective farms should have 
found owners. Lands left unappropriated will be transferred to the local state 
authorities. 
The seasonal leasing of pasture land based on seasonal fluctuations in 
resources would seem natural: mountain dwellers need winter pastures, since 
the pastures they own are snowed-under in winter; while plain dwellers need 
summer pastures (the fields they own are used for crop growing and require 
irrigation). This form of mutual relationship, which is often not fixed in writing, 
is called transhumance. In Soviet times, transhumance was officially 
supported and extended. The driving of cattle served as an indicator of 
peacefulness or tension in a region. The cessation of transhumance within a 
republic as well as within some valleys indicated a worsening of relations. In 
this way, the existence of such institutions points to a peaceful situation, 
although they are hardly capable of providing a basis for the prevention of 
conflicts - yet they do point the way to a relatively peaceful coexistence. Some 
of these “naturally” occurring institutions are then consolidated in official plans 
of land usage, i.e. they are formalized. 
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2.2 Conflict between the state and local community over rules 
relating to the distribution and use of land 
The conflict between administration and villagers in Karachay-Cherkessia 
can assume various guises. The management of a collective farm might 
contest the land that members intend to privatize, or the management may be 
entirely against privatization. The use of administrative pressure and legal 
support makes it easy to find a “catch” with which privatization might be 
hindered. The management might also prolong the transfer of land, leasing it 
to a third party without informing shareholders or forcing them to lease the 
land back again. The main factor increasing the risks inherent in reforms is a 
weak connection between reform and local specifics. For hundreds of years, 
reforms have been implemented in a top-down fashion; and local communities 
may avoid or ignore reforms, and this can at times lead to conflict. 
The role of self-management in regulating land and territorial relations 
grew after the state’s strength had become weakened at the local level (in 
1990s). The smallest units are the village municipalities (village 
administrations), which, as a rule, were brought into existence according to an 
ethnic settlement pattern. In addition, the framework of the collective farm 
exercised everyday control over land usage. Now, more than ten different 
forms of collective farms exist. The most common is the SPK, which stands 
for Agricultural Production Cooperative (usually a previous collective farm). 
Peasant-owned farms are a new phenomenon, upon which many hopes were 
founded as reforms were being carried out. However, this western form did 
not acclimatise itself, largely because the peasant did not himself become the 
real owner of the land. In addition, official registration, tax payments and other 
formalities were not to the liking of many peasants. Especially in Karachay-
Cherkessia, peasants left the collective farms, but declined the status of 
farmer. Not unimportant in hindering the development of legal business in 
agriculture has been the absence of any concept of “taxation” among the 
peoples of the North Caucasus.5 
                                            
5
 Polyakov S.P., Bushkov V.I. Sozialno-economicheskaya situazia v Severo-Kavkazskom 
regione. Issledovania po prikladnoi I neotloghnoi etnologii. №108, 1997. 
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Already in the 1990s, many citizens and citizens' associations tried to 
obtain land shares by referring to the Law of the Russian Federation. One 
example is illustrated in the newspaper “Gazeta Juga” from September 2002. 
“In 2001 more than 400 inhabitants of the settlement Dugulubgej decided to 
unite themselves within a new agricultural association. They met and passed 
a statute, yet the Baksan District’s Administration Chief refused registration. 
Only after arbitrational court examinations, which took many months, were the 
actions of the Chef of Administration considered illegal and he was obliged to 
register the association “Dugulubgej”. In addition, the imposed sentence of the 
court could not speed up the registration of the new association. Only after 
instituting legal proceedings and under the threat of a major fine did the chief 
of Baksan district administration register the association “Dugulubgej”. 
Meanwhile, it took the administration chief only one day to register another 
association “Tambijewo” in the same settlement. According to complaints, the 
best land and most commodities will pass into the possession of this 
association. After registration of the association “Dugulubgej”, the chief of the 
Baksan district administration refused to give either land shares or property to 
association members, which they desired and wished to put together for 
common production activities. The dispute between the members of the 
association “Dugulubgej” and the chief of the district went to the arbitrary court 
of KBR once again. The inhabitants of the settlement made demands to have 
an agricultural association “Kysburun” declared invalid. They claimed it had 
been founded in Dugulubgej in 1998 by the authority of the district in defiance 
of federal and republican laws. In the opinion of the barrister representing the 
settlements’ inhabitants, the current situation for agricultural manufacturers is 
forcing persons to remain dependent: “Today, 2000 to 2500 hectares of land 
in every settlement are being leased. The leasing payments go to the 
administration. The chiefs of villages and districts can decide to whom they 
will give lands, how much, and at what price; otherwise, they will lose their 
powers and won’t be able to influence people any more. Furthermore, the law 
“About the use of agricultural land” allows authorities to give lands to people 
of their choice. Great areas already have nominated owners”. 
The inhabitants of Dugulegbej, Baksanenok, Karagach, Psykhurej and 
Islamej consider the current situation to be prone to conflict: formally, lands 
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belong to communities but, in actual fact, are at the disposal of officials. 
Thousands of rural manufacturers do not have any rights, so are in essence 
farm labourers. And such people want to be freed from the “yoke of feudal 
oppression” and seek help to as to have recognized their constitutional right to 
land ownership and the right to engage in production activities of their choice. 
And they would like to have these officials called to account for the outrages. 
 
The privatization of land in Karachay-Cherkessia takes place above all 
in the plains and foothills. Several factors explain the absence of privatization 
of agricultural land in the mountain collectives. Firstly, there is always a lack of 
land in mountainous regions, where land, since time immemorial, has been 
held in common (for instance, winter pastures). Private owners held onto 
small plots for haymaking and crop-growing even in Soviet times. There has 
been no need to register ownership officially since their owners have often 
been recognized as such for centuries. In many cases, land belongs directly 
to the local authorities (often not even the village, but the district authorities) 
who lease the land. 
Publications in regional newspapers – announcements about peasants 
withdrawing their land from the collective - are the means by which 
privatization is legitimated and land areas are appropriated. The essence of 
notices published in the main republican newspaper lies in the formal 
publishing of agreements reached between villagers and shareholders from 
the collective farm regarding the latter’s withdrawal of land from land 
previously held jointly. Diverse motives for doing so are indicated; and the 
most frequent ones are “in order to lease”, to establish a private farm etc. In 
some cases, the motive is simply not indicated, and an intention to withdraw 
land is stated. In the village of Vazhnoe the standard phrase was “to expand 
individual private farming”. A typical announcement had in it the following: We, 
the shareholders of such and such collective enterprise (list of surnames, 
initials or first names) hereby inform persons of the withdrawal from the 
collective of this land share (size is indicated, as a rule between 2 and 6 
hectares per person, with the type of land indicated – arable land, a hayfield 
or pasture); and there is its location and the reason for withdrawal. All such 
notices contain a phrase stating that “objections must be submitted within a 
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period of 1 month from the date of publication”. In this way, press publication 
is one particular means of legitimising the appropriation of space. 
 
Privatization of land in Kabardino-Balkaria  
The flat country and foothill lands are of agricultural value – and such 
lands are subject to prickly discussions. The general and official opinion of 
Kabardian voters can be reduced to three possible scenarios concerning the 
future destiny of the most fertile and densely populated lands in the flat 
country: a) the land will be distributed free of charge in the form of shares; b) 
the land shall in no way be privatised; c) the form of ownership is not 
important, for the efficiency of the land tenure does not depend on this; and 
other instruments of regulation need to be developed, e.g. leasing or state 
regulation. 
 
A) Dividing everything: This opinion can be summarized as follows: 
preservation of the existing state of affairs could mean a direct route to slave 
ownership and feudalism. The republic is not in possession of oil, gas, or gold. 
There are only two real resources: land and forest, the latter in lesser 
amounts than the former. Those who own land have power. These rights at 
present belongs to the heads of municipal authorities – and one can see how 
they take advantage of this. 
Among political forces operating in the republic, the most active grouping 
in favour of privatization is the Union of the Right Forces. One of the leaders 
of the regional branch of the Union of the Right Forces gave the following 
opinion: "There is no freedom without property, and vice versa. By having 
property, that is, a share of land, a person will feel like a citizen. In the next 
stage, he will require political freedoms in order to protect his property. So he 
will not vote for somebody favoured from above - he will make his choice as 
regards an effective chief of administration according to his own interests. 
Today, he doesn’t care for whom he votes – for a bottle of vodka he will vote 
for anybody. And even if he doesn't vote, others will put his “right” vote into 
the ballot-box. For many years, village inhabitants used to be a cheap 
electorate. At any moment the authorities might “block the supply of oxygen” - 
switch off water, electricity or gas. It is a slavish form of dependence. So the 
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“vertical of power” – a dream of Putin for Russia – has existed in our republic 
for a long time. If a countryman receives his own share of land, he can 
dispose of it - lease it, bond it, grant it to someone, sell it, etc. In this case, 
officials can play no important role. So it is obvious that local officials will 
hamper the progress of such reform". 
 
B) Dividing nothing. The short formulation of the case against 
privatization would be: for a republic with such a small land resource, such 
reform will lead to conflicts and social enmity. During the last 15 years, socio-
political conditions have been finely balanced. Should a distribution of land 
shares be declared, everybody will wish to receive land – those who are 
entitled to it, and those who are not. On the domestic level, it would be difficult 
to explain to people that one’s neighbour is entitled to something, but they 
themselves are not. Also, the question arises: what to do with this land? Sell 
it? Who will buy it? Rich people will buy up land… And, tomorrow, the same 
question will arise as regards privatization vouchers: we have being deceived, 
robbed, so let's reconsider the results of privatization... In addition, there are 
no guarantees that privatization will increase the efficiency of land usage – 
indeed, efficiency may well show a decrease at the beginning. 
 
C) Leasing and state regulation. This point of view is well represented 
by the deputy minister of Agriculture of KBR, Mr. Zhirugov: "Historical 
experience proves that the efficiency of land usage does not depend on the 
form of ownership – not here, and not abroad. As for processing, protection 
and other actions, the most favourable thing for the value of the land and for 
its quality is large-scale commodity production. Such a manufacturer needs 
greater areas, which are more favourable for leasing - one doesn’t need to 
invest in the land purchase. Problems like, for example, a mortgage and the 
right of leasing on the security of credit, insurance of risks, and so on can be 
solved with a help of corresponding amendments to the land law and banking 
acts. Whatever the form of ownership might be, there is a need for state 
regulation in the agrarian sector. Farmers suffer a lot with the absence of any 
planning: what to plant, how much production is required, the price at which 
goods can be sold, etc. Often, peasants or small manufacturers who start the 
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‘new art’ of cultivation are financially ruined after only one agricultural season 
-  so don’t want to get involved in it any more. Time and again it happens like 
this: for example, this year garlic is sold at a high price. Next year, most 
farmers will plant garlic - so the price for it will go down dramatically, and 
some of them won’t be able to sell any garlic at all. In the summer of 2005 we 
witnessed such a situation with tomatoes and red pepper; and in the summer 
of 2006 with cucumbers. In August 2006, one could see cucumbers lying 
along roadsides and rotting, even though one could buy them for 2-5 Roubles 
a kilo. At the beginning of September the sale price for cucumbers rose to 20-
25 Roubles a kilo. There is no purchasing system. Expectations that prices 
will be regulated by the market are not met. In such a situation only state 
intervention can make land use more effective. It might be via the 
development of national projects, investments or even a regulation of prices 
for specific goods in order to give the population social protection. Being an 
official, I totally agree that the constitutional right to land ownership should be 
realized. But being a specialist I don’t think it would raise efficiency.” 
 
Tricks of the state – the juridical jungle  
The first potentially contentious factor is a differentiation of property. There 
is no inventory of land yet in KBR, and the borders between the republic’s and 
the municipality’s property are still undefined. Supporters of privatization 
suggest defining the shares of municipal and republican land simultaneously. 
Opponents suggest dealing with municipal property first and only then 
”thinking about securing the rights of the rural population". Some experts are 
convinced that, in such a case, rural dwellers won’t get anything at all. If the 
land is legalized as municipal property, it might lead to civil war, as people will 
get no land. Municipalities do not offer anything free of charge even if, 
according to law, the property of municipalities cannot be sold. According to 
Article 10 of the Federal Law from 27.01.2003 "About the agricultural use of 
land” land that is municipal property can be sold only by auction or, in 
exceptional cases, to farmers, who will lease the land for no less then three 
years, and at the market price or at a price set by the relevant official body of 
the Federation.’ 
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There is also another legislative dodge here. According to the Federal Law 
"About the agricultural use of land”, lands which have not been privatised 
before January 27th, 2007 but which remain at the disposal of debtors' 
economies can be withdrawn by creditors into confidential management. 
Today, most assignees of collective farms and state farms are already 
bankrupt, or are keeping one step ahead of bankruptcy. They have debts of 
many millions, made up of what they owe to energy monopolists, financial 
institutions or the Pension fund. 
The state takes full advantage of the legislative jungle in order to expand 
its power, in particular, using ‘change of territory’ status as a tool. Several 
settlements have been given the status of towns: e.g. settlement Dugulubgej 
has been connected to the regional centre Baksan, settlement Chegem has 
been given the status of a town, settlements Hasanja and Belaya Rechka 
have been connected to Nalchik... After political decisions, settlements where 
inhabitants have traditionally led a rural way of life have been given the status 
of towns. One cannot speak about any urban infrastructure, of course - at 
least at present. Then, dwellers in these settlements have lost all their 
privileges concerning taxation, payment for energy resources, etc. Numerous 
protests by inhabitants of such settlements have not been successful. For 
example, in Hasanja (mostly populated by Balkars) even a referendum was 
held on this matter (the Central Executive Committee of Kabardino-Balkaria 
declared its results illegal). Only on the third attempt was a referendum 
successfully organized – for it was cancelled twice after rulings from the 
Nalchik city court. According to the initiative group, 52 percent of the 
settlement’s inhabitants took part in the referendum, and 99.4 percent voted 
for independence from Nalchik. If this state of affairs doesn’t change, tens of 
thousands of people will thus lose their right to a share of land. 
 
Conflict over land between the state and the local community 
 
Village of El'brus, Kabardino-Balkaria. With the start of privatization of non-
agricultural land, the price of land has shot up, in some recreational areas 
reaching several thousand dollars for 0.01 hectares. The administrative 
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change in the category of land has deprived locals of the freedom to dispose 
of their own land, hayfields and common pastures. In 2005, inhabitants of 
El’brus protested against a change in the status of their settlement, from 
agricultural to urban, because it impaired their rights to land, in particular 
reducing the size of land plots for garden farming. The conflict has not yet 
been resolved. 
Settlement of Kubina, Karachay-Cherkessia. At the end of June 2005, the 
administration of the town of Ust'-Dzheguta decided to add part of the lands 
belonging to the settlement of Kubina - inhabited mostly by Abazins - to 
municipal lands. As a result, the Abazin aul were deprived of lands that have 
generated major revenue. This led to a bitter conflict. The Abazins burst into 
the Parliament of the republic and occupied the building. The Abazins 
community demanded the immediate formation of an Abazins administrative 
district. The conflict has not yet been resolved. 
 
 
 
Fieldwork materials thereby show that the most important conflicts are not 
between different groups (ethnic or regional) but between local communities 
and the state. At the present time federal, regional and local authorities have 
no clear strategies regarding how reforms should be carried out at the local 
level. 
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3 Policy Options 
3.1 Trends and scenarios 
Several scenarios are possible depending on how local reforms will be 
dealt with: 
 
1. “Game of compromise” between state (federal) demands and regional 
conditions. This is the current scenario, which excludes the local population 
from decision-making. Instead, regional and federal officials make decisions 
about the game - in their favour. The following trends can be seen here: 
 
Table 3. Trends evolving given adoption of the first strategy 
Areas of 
activities with 
the new law 
Factual trends according to the current low-activity 
operation of laws 
1. A shift in the 
status of local 
self-
governance 
• A formal allocation of power, a real reduction in freedom 
(impossible to provide social protection, roads, water 
supply, etc. with local budget expenses). Thus, the self-
financing threat will mean that there is even more 
dependence upon the authorities. 
• A growing role of paternalistic connections to deal with 
the deficit of local authorities being able to handle local 
problems (countrymen, businesspersons, relatives, etc., 
who possess power at the regional level or financial 
resources assumed as contact persons). 
• The co-opting of traditional institutions, formal revival and 
a loss of actual influence. 
2. A shift in the 
status of land 
• Privatization of agricultural land in the plain areas of 
Karachay-Cherkessia; lands in mountain areas are the 
state’s property. 
• The state remains the main distributor of land in 
Kabardino-Balkaria. Instead of privatisation, the 
importance of leasing will grow (as the state is 
represented by corporate groupings, such groups will 
gain control over land). 
• The infringing of interests of traditional users due to a 
change of settlements’ status, i.e. from rural to urban. 
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Strategy 1 is not effective and will have a negative impact on stability (as 
events in Nalchik in the autumn of 2005 showed). 
 
2. “Pragmatic” solutions. Here, reforms are undertaken without any 
compromises being made with regional authorities: empowerment of the local 
level, a reduction in state subsidies, the introduction of market prices for land. 
Many ‘unpromising’ settlements (mainly in mountain areas) will be threatened 
with disappearance because local budgets cannot provide people with social 
support or work. An outbidding of land will lead to growing economic activity 
but may also heighten social tensions between the rich and poor, as well as 
between ethnic groups. And social conflicts could well eradicate any positive 
economic effects seen. 
 
3. Pseudo-regionalism. This strategy is similar to the first strategy, 
although regional authorities have the central role to play in the bringing about 
of reform. This could have a positive effect. Such utopian schemes were 
proposed, for example, for the reconstruction of Chechnya (the granting of a 
wide range of freedoms, an off-shore zone, etc.). However, the regional 
authority is far from perfect. Seeking to imitate “specific features“ of the region 
may lead to conditions where regional corporate groups (clans) will 
monopolize access to land resources and have complete control of the local 
level. This could well turn out to be more economically profitable overall 
(having low transaction costs in relation to the federal level); yet it might lead 
to a major impoverishment of one social group at the cost of enriching others 
(such a process is evident now, though is still under control). While the threat 
of social conflict (see second strategy) may undermine the economic benefits. 
 
4. Localism – means that the interests of local actors will be taken into 
consideration. The most effective but labour-intensive approach would begin 
with the solving of problems posed by local actors. Their interests are not 
considered, though. Nowadays, reforms come from above, irrespective of 
whether people want them or not. Yet the potential coming from a local level 
is by no means exhausted, for rural area dweller are able to unite state and 
local interests, as well as to explore ways of reform. This scenario will require 
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ancillary institutional support, the organizing of local alternative institutions, 
NGO’s, etc. - which will help in the realization of development ideas. 
 
Table 4. An evaluation of the contemporary strategies 
Strategies Who determines the 
strategy? 
An evaluation of 
economic efficiency 
Impact on 
conflicts and 
stability 
Game of 
compromise 
Federal and regional 
officials 
Low In spite of there 
being apparent 
control of the 
situation, there 
is a danger of 
conflict 
intensification 
Pragmatic 
solutions 
Federal officials and 
outside experts 
Pseudo-
regionalism 
Regional authorities 
Relatively high, though 
a low aggregated form 
(social outcomes being 
quite limited). 
An increase in 
tension 
Localism Local actors Relatively low Decreased 
tension 
 
3.2 Options based on a comparative analysis of policy experiences 
in case-study regions 
 
A comparison of Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachay-Cherkessia reveals 
several institutional mechanisms that might be able to regulate conflicts over 
land and control powers at a local level: 
1. A monopolizing of conflict areas by the state; 
2. A framing of democratic conditions for the self-regulation of conflict 
(e.g., free market). 
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A temporary lessening of conflict potential can be induced via the 
mechanism of sidelining/neutralizing areas of conflict, for instance with a 
monopolization by the state of strategic resources or positions (thus 
eliminating risk). The most blatant example is the awarding of federal status to 
a number of territories. Such means of regulating conflicts cannot be 
assessed as being entirely positive as short-term, positive effects could be 
counterproductive in the long term. 
In Kabardino-Balkaria, most of the land (agricultural land) is a state 
monopoly and, consequently, is not something that causes conflicts between 
groups. Conflicts between local communities and the state have escalated, 
however - which is most evident when peasants’ rights to land are threatened 
(and even traditional lands that they have always held).  
In Karachay-Cherkessia, a land market has begun to form itself, creating a 
whole slew of new actors, as a rule representing mini-social groups (such as 
family and kinship associations).  
In Kabardino-Balkaria, the state has continued the Soviet policy of 
penetrating the area right down to the local level, in spite of all the directives 
that have been arrived at in Russia in recent years. Municipalities essentially 
remained part of the state; state structures control the land; and peasants are 
tied to the state via the institution of land leasing. Measures taken at a federal 
level to free localities from excessive state regulation have only remained on 
paper in the republic. The state continues to control local spaces. The spirit of 
federal laws is being re-interpreted for the benefit of regional authorities. 
Citizens’ initiatives that go against decisions made by the regional authorities 
come to a standstill. Officially, such stalemates are justified by there being a 
likelihood of conflicts occurring should land be privatized.6 
In Karachay-Cherkessia, the privatization of agricultural land is proceeding 
rapidly, although the state is endeavouring to retain a strong hold at the local 
level. State officials make use of a variety of means to obstruct the 
development of private land holdings. One of these is the transfer of land to a 
                                            
6
 One of the other original versions: «…land in Kabardino-Balkaria means grain – for distilling 
spirits. The quantity of this resource is not known and is not taxed. But there are around 20 
registered, private distilleries in the republic.». Luiza Orazaeva, NatsBez.ru, 12 July 2004.  
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legal category in which private ownership is to be excluded. There are a large 
number of categories existing for state land: a land reserve, state forestry, 
urban municipality land, a nature reserve, etc. Nevertheless, in comparison 
with Kabardino-Balkaria, a large step towards the de-monopolisation of state 
land rights has now been taken. 
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4 Recommendations 
This analytical report emphasizes the necessity of developing a strategy of 
localism, one that supports the institutional sphere - which is the main nexus 
of reform - to strengthen the equality of local, regional and federal levels. 
According to our working hypothesis, short-term stability in Kabardino-
Balkaria, which is based on centralized forms of governance, will lead to 
economic and social stagnation and, in consequence, to the polarization of 
society and a growth in tension. In order to avoid this, local actors and 
institutions should have greater roles to play in the area. This would comply 
with structural conditions in the region. The example of Karachay-Cherkessia 
proves the adequacy of this strategy: the pluralistic and the more democratic 
environment in this republic has its risks, but is more adequate to a multi-
ethnic mountainous region that seeks long-term stability. 
 
More specific recommendations within the framework of the strategy of 
“localism” might be adopted depending on the specific features of the region. 
Still, some recommendations, which are important for each region, can be 
highlighted. 
1. Decentralization. It is now obvious that state officials are not only 
unable to implement progressive laws of municipal and land reform as such, 
but may also commit sabotage and find ways of avoiding them. A strong 
‘vertical of power’ and a centralization of power in Kabardino-Balkaria is 
blocking the development of other actors and any diversification of institutions. 
With their own interests, and given a conflict between the population at large 
and the state, public organizations (though only gingerly, so far) have started 
to seek the protection of citizens’ interests. In Kabardino-Balkaria, for 
example, a Council of Elders is actively trying to intercede in the regulation of 
disputes between actors from local, regional and republican levels. 
Nonetheless, at the local level an institutional vacuum still exists, for there are 
weak structures of local self-governance and weak traditional institutions. This 
is the main obstacle to the occurrence of reforms. In consequence, the speed 
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and direction of reforms will strongly depend on officials. One research 
respondent - an official in a quite high position - said: “Concerning the issue of 
local reforms and land as property, everybody’s interests should be taken on 
board. If the mechanism of reform is not convincing and does take into 
account, for example, the interests of bureaucrats - well, believe me, they will 
find any opportunity to halt or at least to block reform...”  
2. Institutional capacity building. It is important to improve institutional 
capacities with regard to reform achievement. The state should create 
favourable conditions for the development of regional, non-governmental 
organizations, which can bring together the different local actors. Taking into 
consideration the fact that NGOs used to be discredited as “agents of the 
West”, it will take time until public and traditional organizations and also 
institutions reappear. Trust in these institutions is based upon natural 
connections being had with the local population. Thus, NGOs should develop 
from the bottom up, i.e. and not be foisted on persons from above. Another 
approach towards building up institutional capacities at the local level is used 
in some CIS countries - where local communities in mountain regions 
primarily rely on traditional institutions. In Kyrgystan, for instance, to ensure 
the legitimacy of local institutions, so-called territorial self-government bodies 
were set up, staffed by villagers working on a voluntary basis, who aim to help 
bring about land and water reform. In spite of the relatively small number of 
these bodies they have given a certain impetus to village life; and this has 
done much to generate legitimacy and confidence on the part of other 
villagers and on the part of central government authorities7. 
3. Creating trust. Decision-making concerning local self-governance and 
changes in land ownership need to be discussed at a local level. The most 
important issues should be discussed in Councils of Elders or via other 
traditional institutions. The law on self-governance empowers the population 
as regards self-organization and the forming of authorities. Besides the 
centralized bureaucratic mechanism, which seeks to prevent reform, rights’ 
realization is also hindered due to social apathy as well as to active anti-
                                            
7
 Gunya Alexey. Cross-border cooperation at local level in the Alps, the Caucasus and the 
mountains of Central Asia. Berlin, 2007. 
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propaganda. “Explanatory work” conducted among the population may lead to 
a situation where people try to withdraw from the public sphere. For instance, 
many people in Kabardino-Balkaria do not realize that if they obtain a share of 
land this needn’t oblige them to cultivate it. Indeed, there is a lot of 
propaganda about a lack of technical equipment for land cultivation, a lack of 
finances for seeds purchasing, and about land taxation. Thus, the rural 
population sees land as a burden! This is why clear information about 
privatisation should be actively spread, for example lists of persons involved 
in privatisation processes as well as the locations subject to privatisation. 
4. A territorial approach “from the bottom up”. Regions cannot be 
regarded as homogenous territories, having problems that are similar for 
towns and villages, capitals and provinces, mountains and plains. Problems 
and conflicts differ from place to place, from the territory of one ethnic 
grouping to another, from the mountains to the plain, from the centre to the 
periphery. Thus, the applied mechanisms should vary. Finding the 
mechanisms that are most appropriate for any territory depends on the 
competence of the local actors. Reform “from the bottom up” is the best tool 
with which to adapt federal and regional initiatives to local conditions. 
5. New mechanisms. In order to be able to make use of new approaches, 
local businesspersons need a certain freedom of choice. In addition, means of 
obtaining credit should be diversified and there should be the elimination of 
the “state racket” (taxation, customs duties, limitations of credits, etc.). For 
example, to get credit in KBR, enterprises are supposed to receive a 
‘guarantee’ from the ministry of agriculture – which points to way to official 
circumlocution. A state program should thus be developed to support 
initiatives from the local level in the creation of special and independent 
developmental funds.  
6. Effective control and regulation. A change in land ownership will 
inevitably lead (due to purchases and sales) to a concentration of big tracts of 
land in the hands of specific persons. So as to prevent monopolization, a 
limitation of land shares (in property) in the hands of just one owner should be 
introduced legislatively. Members of the republic’s commission on land could 
suggest, for example, limiting land ownership to a maximum of ten percent 
within the boundaries of 1 municipal district and up to 30-40 percent within the 
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boundaries of a municipal settlement. Regardless of whether the issue is 
brought up, it is obvious that the inhabitants of different regions of the republic 
will not get equal status for the quantity and quality of allotted land. Still, this 
should not go against reforms. The local population will have no real claims to 
other land except their own. The most optimal alternative seems to be a 
situation where those categories of rural inhabitants who have a legal 
entitlement will be able to obtain shares of land – and to undertake this in a 
‘quiet’ atmosphere, certain conditions should be met. First, a complete 
inventory of land should be made: only lands that are available for land 
sharing may be allotted. Secondly, the government should come up with a 
complete list of those persons who are able to make a claim to land shares; 
and if this condition isn't met or is postponed, there may non-predictable 
consequences. Thirdly, it is important to provide ‘enabling arrangements’ in 
order to support new owners, at least at the beginning, in their decision-
making: for example, whether to cultivate one’s land, to cultivate it alone or 
within an agricultural association, to lease additional land or not…? Such 
decisions could have as their basis franchise credits or even interest-free 
loans. Such forms of support already exist in the program for the priority 
national project of KBR, “Developing the agricultural-industrial complex” - 
though they are not being used in the most suitable way. The presence of the 
state will be justified when it comes to the area of control over credit agencies 
and insurance companies.  
7. To make it work effectively, the process of privatization should be 
transparent. Every citizen should have access to information about the 
quantity and quality of land shares and about categories of citizen who are 
entitled to claim land. Also, explanatory work among the population should be 
done both as regards procedures via which to prepare oneself for ownership 
as well as regarding the founding of agricultural associations, opportunities to 
lease owned land, etc.   
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